An organiszation with a broad constitutional base, such as the UN, means that though states may control the creation of the organiszation, once created it can develop a significant separate will. Although state representatives sit in the organs, the fact of majority rule, and the interpretation of the mandates of organs by entities and individuals working within the organiszation, signify that it is no longer in the control of each state.
The establishment of a constitutional order signifies the importance of the purposes and principles of the Charter-found in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2. These express the object and purpose of the Charter, and delineate the maximum extent of constitutional growth. Thus, the practice of the various organs as a means of developing and protecting these purposes and principles becomes important, as does the implication of powers, though not expressly granted, to achieve the aims of the organiszation. 10 The text becomes less important, but there are still clear legal limits as set by the constitution. For instance, Article 2(7) states that nothing in the Charter permits the UN to intervene within the domestic affairs of states and thus represents a restriction on the competence of the UN, though its scope has been narrowed over the years. 11 Both the Security Council and the General Assembly have increasingly intervened in the internal affairs of states, tackling issues such as the denial of human rights and self-determination on the basis that abuse can constitute a danger or threat to the peace, when asserting competence over matters of peace and security, or on the basis that the promotion and development of human rights and self-determination is, in itself, within the purposes and competence of the UN. 12 Thus, the Charter is a living instrument-it evolves and develops-thereby enabling it to keep pace with developments in the international order. 12 UN Charter, Articles 1(2), 1(3), 55, and 56, UN Charter. 13 Uniting for Peace, UNGA Res 377 (1950 The prohibition on the threat or use of force is the most important principle in the UN Charter. The absence of widespread use of force by members, as well as the presence of a centraliszed and legitimate monopoly on the use of violence, are the basic elements for the survival of any society. Since Article 2(4) purports to control the threat or use of force by stating a norm of international law to which states must conform, and the Security
Council is concerned with maintaining international peace by, inter alia, taking action against states using force in contravention of Article 2(4), it is plausible to examine the possibility of a correlation between Article 2(4) and the competence of the Security Council. One possible (narrow) approach is to restrict the Security Council's coercive competence under Chapter VII to threats or uses of force prohibited by Article 2(4).
Following from this, Chapter VI empowers the Council to deal with potential breaches, whereas Chapter VII allows it to deal with actual breaches of Article 2(4). Indeed, further to this argument there is a direct relationship between the concept of 'threat of force'
under Article 2(4) and the concept of 'threat to the peace' under Article 39, and that of 'use of force' under Article 2(4) and those of 'breach of the peace' or 'act of aggression' under Article 39. Such a thesis envisages that the Charter established a 'closed' rather
than an 'open' system. The Security Council's competence would be defined, at its limits,
by Article 2(4); and to determine that a situation was a 'threat to the peace' when it was not a 'threat of force' would be ultra vires.
14 Nevertheless, the Charter was neither constructed with such precision in mind, nor has it been interpreted in that manner. The trigger for Chapter VI, that the situation or dispute endangers international peace found in Article 34, is not confined to potential breaches of Article 2(4). Furthermore, the triggers for Chapter VII are not to be equated with breaches of Article 2(4) since the concern of the Security Council is with world peace and security, much broader notions than the threat of armed force or the actual use of armed force. This concern for peace and security spreads to issues such as the proliferation in armaments, the spread of terrorism, the disintegration of failed and failing states, massive flows of refugees, egregious violations of human rights-all issues that might threaten international peace and security, but all matters that fall outside of Article 2(4). security concerns run alongside human rights, so that when fulfilling its primary purpose, the UNSCouncil must have regard to human rights. As will be seen, the Assembly too has a concern for both peace and security, and for human rights and self-determination, and though it does not have mandatory powers in these fields, it is governed in the exercise of its powers by the purposes and principles of the Charter, as well as any express limitations. international peace and security. 60 The Court stated that Assembly practice had moved towards consistently acting in 'parallel' with the same matter concerning international peace and security. 61 Furthermore, the Court also stated that it was 'often the case that, while the Security Council has tended to focus on aspects of such matters related to international peace and security, the General Assembly has taken a broader view, considering also their humanitarian, social and economic aspects'. 62 The Court considered that this 'accepted practice' was consistent with the UN Charter specifically
Article 12, 63 and in so doing dismissed Israel's argument that such practice was ultra vires as it argued that the Security Council was the body entrusted with matters of peace and security. Ccoalition take necessary measures to repel the attack of North Korea and to restore international peace and security to the area. 72 In fact, the Assembly adopted an 'enforcement' resolution on Korea after the Soviets had returned to the Security Council but before the Uniting for Peace rResolution was adopted. The Soviet Union objected strongly to the Rresolution, in particular it argued that it violated the Charter requirement that coercive power was granted solely to the Security rResolution, there appears to be no cogent argument against allowing the Assembly to recommend military measures to combat a threat to the peace.
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There can be no doubt that Uniting for Peace was designed to enable the United Nations to achieve one of its primary purposes: the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. In addition to fulfilling the UN's purposes, such a power must also be consistent with the principles of the United Nations contained in Article 2.
Although Article 2(7), prohibiting UN intervention in domestic affairs, only expressly Operation in the Congo (ONUC), which acted in a more muscular fashion. Although it may be argued that these two operations were more 'peacekeeping' than 'enforcement', and thus are not direct precedents for seeking an enforcement mandate, the reality was Peace provokes controversy, not only out of legal concerns, but because it embodies a very different approach to collective security than that envisaged by the Security Council.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the legality of the Uniting for Peace rResolution was not really questioned when the Assembly utilizsed its reconvened tenth emergency special session in 2003 to request an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the construction of a security wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, in which the Court determined that the construction of the security wall by Israel was illegal. 88 In determining it had jurisdiction the Court was concerned, inter alia, with whether the conditions of the rResolution were satisfied rather than with the legality of Uniting for Peace itself. 89 However, in determining that those conditions were; -firstly that the Council had failed to exercise its primary responsibility as a result of one or more vetoes, and, secondly, that the situation is one where there appeared to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression', 90 -the Court was effectively endorsing the Assembly's competence in matters of peace and security as contained in the Rresolution.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Assembly is a slumbering giant, in thrall to the smaller but sporadically powerful
